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RESPONSES TO TRANSCRIPT

Back to the Past: AntiPragmatism in American Conflicts
Law
by Patrick J. Borchers*
I am grateful to the editors of the Mercer Law Reuiew for the
opportunity to comment upon the symposium honoring Brainerd Currie.
As one would expect given the fine panel assembled, the discussions
were lively, well-informed, thoughtful, and thought-provoking. And, of
course, it is well to honor Currie, who was perhaps the father-at the
very least the midwife-of the conflicts revolution.
There is no denying that Currie's "interest" vocabulary helped
American courts escape the grip of the place-of-the-injury rule in tort
conflict cases.' His tripartite division between true conflicts, false
conflicts, and unprovided-for cases is orthodoxy to most American
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1. See, e.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 282 (N.Y. 1963).
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conflicts academics and many courts. The influence of interest analysis
with courts is undeniably broad in tort cases, though less so in other
areas.2 Although I find myself in strong disagreement with Currie and
his followers on many points, he helped usher in an era of fairer results,
particularly for interstate tort victims.
What, then, could one possibly find to disagree with in a theory that
was the product of the labors of a brilliant, moderate man and has
produced fairer results than its predecessor? Well, at least in my case,
the answer is "quite a lot."
Let us begin by examining the fundamental premises of interest
analysis. Notwithstanding the elegant vocabulary in which it is draped,
Currie's theory largely-at least in tort cases-involves substituting
personal connecting factors for territorial ones. In other words, interest
analysts faced with an interstate tort case are usually much more
concerned with where the parties are residents, domiciled, incorporated,
or headquartered than they are with where the injury took place. Of
course, the analysts are not always just concerned with personal
connecting factors, and they do not always ignore the territorial ones.
But for Currie's followers, the priority of personal over territorial is the
rule, not the exception.
Thus, for instance, the panelists largely agree that the Arizona
nonsurvival rule protected Arizona heirs in Grant v. McAuliffe,3 that the
Ontario guest statute protected Ontario defendants and their insurers
in Babcock v. Jackson,4 that the Oregon spendthrift rule at issue in
Lilienthal v. Kaufman' protected Oregon spendthrifts, that the6
charitable immunity rule in Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc.
protected New Jersey charities, that the New York rule of unlimited
recovery for wrongful death in Rosenthal v. Warren7 protected New York
plaintiffs, and so on. Given that, Arizona lacked an interest in Grant
because no Arizona defendants were involved, Ontario had no interest
in Babcock because of the absence of an Ontario defendant or insurer,
Oregon had an interest in Lilienthal because an Oregon spendthrift was
a party, New Jersey had an interest in Schultz because of the New
Jersey defendant, and New York had an interest in Rosenthal because
the decedent was a New Yorker.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Patrick J. Borchers, Conflicts Pragmatism,56 ALB. L. REv. 883 (1993).
264 P.2d 944 (Cal. 1953).
191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963).
395 P.2d 543 (Or. 1964).
480 N.E.2d 679 (N.Y. 1985).
475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 856 (1973).

1997]

BACK TO THE PAST

723

The panelists are in good company in making this assumption, because
this is precisely what Currie said in a famous passage that Harold
Korn8 quite rightly calls one of the most seductive ever written.
Discussing hypothetical variants on the conflicts chestnut Milliken v.
Pratt,9 Currie wrote the following assessment of the even-then-abolished
Massachusetts rule of contractual disability for married women: "The
[Massachusetts] legislature decides in favor of protecting married
women. What married women? Why, those with whose welfare
Massachusetts is concerned, of course-i.e., Massachusetts married
women."'0 This beguiling, but ultimately parochial, premise that states
acquire interests only in their own is the nub of Currie's theory.
In many cases the theory works in a fairly straightforward fashion and
leads to intuitively appealing results. Tort cases in which all of the
parties are domiciled in one state, and the accident occurs in another
state, are almost invariably classified as false conflicts. Thus, for
example, the panelists have little cause for disagreement in their
discussion of Grant v. McAuliffe" because, to use their terminology,
only California has an interest in applying its law. I would submit,
however, that the factor that makes Grant such an easy case is not the
common domicile of its parties, but its avoidance of the anachronistic,
unfair Arizona rule the traditional methodology would have chosen. No
right-thinking judge wants to apply a rule like the Arizona nonsurvival
rule, a guest statute, a cap on wrongful death damages, or any of the
others in the unholy collection of capricious tort rules that dotted the
map in Currie's era.
Although interest analysis is celebrated for its handling of cases such
as Grant, its fabric frays elsewhere. Suppose one turns Grant upsidedown, and places the accident in California, but the forum and the
domicile of both parties is in Arizona. The old place-of-injury rule would
have led to the application of the fairer, more progressive California rule,
but it is now Currie's theory that must swallow the bitter pill of choosing
the Arizona rule. Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc. 2 resembles
this upside-down variation on Grant. It is interesting to observe that in
contrast to the blissful unanimity of the panelists on Grant,they diverge
sharply when discussing Schultz. Some, because of the common domicile
of the parties, treat the case as a false conflict, while others attempt to

8. Harold L. Korn, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: A Critique, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 772,
812 (1993).
9. 125 Mass. 374 (1878).
10.

BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 85 (1963).

11. 264 P.2d 944 (Cal. 1953).
12. 480 N.E.2d 679 (N.Y. 1985).
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turn the case into a true conflict by imagining a generalized New York
interest in deterring illegal conduct within the state's borders.
The problem, ultimately, is that interest analysis is just as tied to
geography as the approach it replaced."8 At least at the theoretical
level, it has no innate tendency to select the better, fairer, more
compassionate tort rules. It is worth noting that in the real Schultz
case, the New York Court of Appeals-purporting to apply interest
analysis-ultimately applied New Jersey's rule of charitable immunity,
leaving the parents of the young boys (one of whom was ultimately
driven to suicide by the molestation he suffered) without any redress for
their grief. It seems sadly ironic that had the New York court adhered
to the old place-of-the-injury rule the parents would not have been left
empty-handed.
Why is it, then, that-in practice-interest analysis has led to fairer
results? The reasons are at least two. First, by preferring the application of forum law in all cases in which the forum has an interest,
interest analysis has a very strong tendency to result in the application
of forum law. 4 Armed with the knowledge that courts are likely to
apply their own law, plaintiffs' counsel can and do forum shop to avoid
unsavory tort rules. Second, the notion of what constitutes an "interest"
is sufficiently vague that it leaves courts with a large amount of
discretion in the classification of cases. Given that courts have great
leeway in classifying cases under Currie's system, their preference for
the
arriving at a just result often can be realized even while maintaining
15
appearance of applying Currie's tripartite classification.
Yet the best feature of interest analysis in practice-the cloak it gives
to courts to apply the better substantive law-is the one that the
analysts try the hardest to avoid in theory. Although Currie certainly
did not have any trouble classifying some tort rules as "better,"
"sounder," and "more deserving" 6 than others, he adamantly denied
that the relative quality of the rules ought be a factor in deciding which
one to choose. And each panelist-with the possible exception of
Professor Felix-follows Currie in denying the appropriateness of the
better law consideration.
All of this leads to an oddly inverted relationship between courts and
much of the conflicts academy. The analysts find themselves in the antipragmatic position of promoting a theory that if applied in the ruthless,

13. FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE 131-39 (1993).
14. For empirical verification, see Patrick J. Borchers, The Choice-of.Law Revolution:
An Empirical Study, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 357, 374 (1992).
15. See, e.g., Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 583 P.2d 721 (Cal. 1978).
16. CURRIE, supra note 10, at 705.
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result-blind manner they urge will lead to the application of unjust tort
rules. In a very real sense, the courts are in front of the academy,
because they have to deal with the real parties involved in the cases.
Reckoning up interests is fun in the abstract, but the possibility that a
grieving spouse will be left without recovery raises the stakes.
The difference between academic and judicial thinking is well
illustrated by Judge Keating's opinion in Tooker v. Lopez." v In the
course of deciding to apply New York's rule of ordinary care, and deny
effect to the Michigan guest statute, Keating was confronted with the
argument that various circumstances in the case were "adventitious."
Keating responded:
For all we know, [the plaintiffs' decedent's] decision to go to Michigan
State University as opposed to New York University may well have
been "adventitious." Indeed, her decision to go to Detroit on the
weekend in question instead of staying on campus and studying may
equally have been "adventitious." The fact is, however, that [she]...
decided to go to Detroit on October 16, 1964; that she was a passenger
in a vehicle registered and insured in New York; and that as a result
of all of these "adventitious" occurrences, she is dead and we have a
case to decide. Why we should be concerned with what might have
been is unclear. 8
The gulf between the analysts and courts is illustrated by the
contrasting phrases "we have a case to decide" and "what might have
been." Although judicial intuition is far from perfect-as cases like
Schultz show-courts are, for the most part, on the "we have a case to
decide" side of the line, whereas the analysts are preoccupied with the
"might have been." The analysts wonder what purpose a rule might
serve, or about the fictional desires of a hypothetical sovereign embodiment of each of the connected states, while courts have real cases to
decide and know the effect that each competing rule will have on the
parties. One can wonder, for instance, what conceivable "interest" the
Michigan guest statute served, but the New York Court of Appeals knew
that the Tooker family's interest was in a chance at recovery.
At the end of the day, I disagree fundamentally with Currie and his
followers because I find their theory unsatisfying and impractical. It is
unsatisfying because it fails to take account of the true, most dominant
interest in adjudication, which is to achieve justice between the parties.
Rather than criticizing the court in Schultz for failing to find some
"deterrent" interest in application of New York tort law (and one

17.
18.

249 N.E.2d 394 (N.Y. 1969).
Id. at 399-400.
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wonders what deterrence can possibly be accomplished by tort rules if
the criminal laws against forcible sodomy of a minor have failed in the
task), is it not more satisfying to criticize the court in Schultz for having
botched the task of doing justice between the parties? Rather than
giving controlling weight to the fact that the Schultz family decided to
make its home in New Jersey, would it not be more satisfying, indeed
more American, to say that the court has an overriding interest in giving
all parties the same quality of justice without regard to their home
state?
Even leaving to one side its unsatisfying character, each passing year
makes classical interest analysis more vulnerable to attack on practical
grounds. Tort law has changed radically since Currie wrote. Alabama
is the only state with a guest statute that has not been repealed or
declared unconstitutional; numerical caps on wrongful death recovery
have disappeared; tort damages almost invariably survive the defendant's death; the number of states following contributory negligence can
be counted on one hand, and so on. Interest analysis seems frozen in
time, still wrestling with the problems of a bygone era. Indeed, of the
cases selected for this symposium, the 1985 Schultz decision is the most
recent, and the others were decided respectively in, 1956, 1953, 1963,
1964, 1973, and 1973.
This is not to be critical of the material selected for this symposium,
because there may be important lessons to be learned from the cases of
this era. But one wonders whether the fixation on cases with small
number of parties and outdated tort rules is not indicative of the
limitations of interest analysis. How, for instance, would the analysts
apply their theory to a nationwide class action brought against an
asbestos or DES manufacturer? Is a court really required to take each
of the thousands of parties and reckon up the interests after considering
their home states and whatever other connections might give a state an
interest? What if this methodology would lead to fifty or more laws
being applied to the same case? And how is a court in such a case to
adhere to Currie's demand that the interests must be assessed for each
issue?
Currie remains the most important writer on American conflicts law,
but largely because he succeeded in substituting a personal law
orthodoxy for the previously-dominant territorial one. The fact remains,
however, that American courts in conflicts cases are too pragmatic to be
consistently bound by any orthodoxy, be it old or new. As a result, there
is an ever widening gap between theory and practice. Ultimately,
interest analysis is too narrow and antipragmatic a theory to account for
the realities of today's litigation, and as such, is fast losing its power to
explain and guide judicial practice in conflicts decisions.

